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Imports, unionization and racial age discrimination in the US 
 
Jacqueline Agesa and Richard U. Agesa 
 
 
Past studies of the relationship between competition and racial wages find that domestic 
competition reduces racial wage discrimination of nonunion workers. This article examines 
the effects of foreign competition on racial wages of union and nonunion workers utilizing 
an empirical model which allows for cluster-adjusted SEs by industry. Such a procedure 
allows independence of observations across industries but not within industries, thereby 
not overstating the significance of industry invariant controls. In this analysis, clustered 
SEs prevent the overstatement of the significance of imports as a means to reduce earnings 
discrimination. We find evidence of a wage premium for nonunion white workers in 
concentrated industries; however, imports cause the wages of nonunion whites to converge 
towards market rates. In contrast, for union workers in concentrated industries, wage 
standardization provides a sanctuary from market power initiated discrimination such 
that imports play a limited role in reducing discrimination. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The neoclassical theory of discrimination has its origin in the literature on expense 
preference (Alchian and Kessel, 1962; Williamson, 1963). The basic premise is that 
profit in noncompetitive product markets gives managers the latitude to pursue objectives 
that are utility maximizing rather than profit maximizing (Becker, 1971). Nonprofit 
maximizing behaviour can result in excessive expenditure on office amenities (Edwards, 
1977; Hannan, 1979; Hannan and Mavinga, 1980), workers’ wages and employer-initiated 
wage discrimination (Becker, 1971). Indeed, Becker’s theory (1971) postulates that some 
portion of labour market discrimination is market power initiated. Moreover, the theory 
suggests that market power initiated discrimination flourishes in profitable, 
noncompetitive industries, whereas intense pressures to reduce cost in highly 
competitive industries reduces employers’ latitude to engage in discrimination. Further, it 
follows that competition in either domestic or global product markets reduces industry 
profit and, therefore, reduces employers’ latitude to engage in market power-initiated 
discrimination. 
Recent study by Peoples (1994) tests the relation- ship between domestic competition 
and racial wage discrimination for union and nonunion workers and finds that increased 
domestic competition reduces the wage premium for white nonunion workers in 
manufacturing industries. However, Peoples finds less racial wage disparity for union 
workers and no evidence that competition induces increased racial wage equality of these 
workers. He argues that standardized earnings and work rules in union employment 
protect black workers from market power initiated earnings discrimination (Freeman, 
1980).   These   findings   suggest   that   collective bargaining curbs market power 
initiated discrimination that has origin in domestic product markets. 
Becker’s theory indicates that market power initiated discrimination can also be 
reduced by foreign competition. Agesa and Hamilton (2004) utilize the Public Use Micro 
Samples (PUMS) to examine the effects of domestic and global competition on racial 
wages and find little evidence that imports reduce discrimination. Given Peoples’ 
(1994) findings of a distinctly different impact of domestic competition on the racial wage 
gap of union and nonunion workers, a limitation of Agesa and Hamilton’s study is the lack 
of controls for worker unionization in the PUMS. Further, their empirical specifications 
do not allow for a different impact of foreign competition on the wages of union and 
nonunion workers. 
This analysis utilizes a sample of manufacturing workers from the 1995 to 2002 
Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORGs) to examine the 
relationship between global competition and racial wages for workers in high- and low- 
concentration industries separately by workers’ union status. Thus, we examine union 
and nonunion differences in imports-induced earnings equality when domestic product 
markets are noncompetitive (highly concentrated industries), relative to the impact when 
domestic product markets are engaged in fierce domestic competition (less-concentrated 
industries). 
Our empirical examination of the relationship is novel in two dimensions. First, our 
sub-sample of manufacturing workers from the CPS ORGs omits workers who have 
imputed wages. Specifically, the wages of these workers are imputed utilizing the 
earnings of a donor who shares a set of common characteristics. The elimination of 
imputed earners is necessary, as recent study provides evidence that regressions that 
utilize imputed earners and include covariates not used  in  the  donor matching criteria 
(e.g. industry and unionization) suffer severe bias (Hirsch and Schumacher, 2004). 
Second, our estimation procedure of the relation- ship utilizes cluster-adjusted SEs, 
which allow for independence of observations across industries but not within industries 
(Moulton, 1990; Wooldridge, 2002). Such a procedure prevents the overstatement of the 
significance of covariates in explaining the dependent variable (Pepper, 2002). In this 
analysis, clustered SEs prevent the exaggeration of the significance of imports as a means 
to reduce racial earnings disparity. Moreover, this analysis offers the first study of the 
relationship between competition (foreign or domestic) and discrimination that takes 
advantage of the large sample size of the CPS ORGs but does not suffer match bias – 
additionally providing extensive industry invariant controls utilizing clustered SEs. 
 
 
 
II. Background 
 
Effects of imports on wages 
 
We first examine the literature on the effects of imports on the wages of workers in 
high- and less- concentrated industries. Borjas and Ramey (1995) provide a theoretical 
model that hypothesizes a negative impact of imports on workers’ wages that will be 
larger for workers in noncompetitive, concentrated industries relative to workers in 
competitive, less-concentrated industries. Their empirical results support this theory. 
Grossman (1984) and Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) provide the theoretical basis for 
the literature on the effect of imports on union and nonunion wages. Lawrence and 
Lawrence (1985) present a model in which increased import competition causes an 
increase in the wages of union workers, whereas Grossman’s (1984) model premises on 
the notions that unions determine wages by majority  rule and that they maximize utility 
of the median worker. In his model, the effects of imports on union wages are ultimately 
dependent on the elasticity of substitution and therefore, imports could cause an increase 
or decrease in union wages. 
Macpherson and Stewart (1990) provide empirical tests of the effects of imports on 
union and nonunion wages. Using the May CPS from 1975 to 1981, they find evidence of 
a significant imports-induced wage penalty for union workers, but no significant penalty 
for their nonunion counterparts. By contrast, recent study by Shippen and Lynch (2002) 
re-examines the influence of imports on union wages and find evidence of imports-
induced wage penalties for union workers in the period 1983 to 1986, but no significant 
evidence for the 1987 to 1994 period. 
 
Competition and earnings discrimination 
 
The premise that noncompetitive market structure is associated with increased market 
power initiated discrimination is a by-product of the expense preference literature. The 
basic notion is that market power provides employers the opportunity to pursue objectives 
that are not profit maximizing (Alchian and Kessel, 1962). Thus, in the absence of 
rigorous product market competition, employers have the latitude to engage in market 
power initiated discrimination. 
Past studies test the notion that domestic competition reduces market power initiated 
discrimination by single- or multiple-industry approaches. The single-industry approach 
has been used to examine the effect of deregulation on racial earnings in the motor 
carrier industry, telecommunications, airlines and rail. With the exception of the airline 
industry, single-industry studies find convincing evidence that enhanced competition 
reduces racial earnings discrimination;¹ however, multiple industry analyses have met 
with mixed success. 
Early multiple-industry studies utilize data that delimit industries into imprecise, two-
digit industry classifications (Fujii and Trapani, 1978; Johnson, 1978), which may mask 
the variance from more precisely defined industries, that otherwise could yield significant 
results. 
As a result, these studies find no relationship between domestic competition and market 
power initiated discrimination. 
The next wave of studies utilizes data with more distinct industry classification 
(Heywood, 1987; Peoples, 1994). Heywood (1987) employs the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). His wage specification includes racial status, market structure and their 
interaction to capture the different impact of market structure on black and white wages. The 
use of an interactive variable to capture racial differences in the impact of market power 
is the standard in literature (Peoples, 1994; Agesa and Monaco, 2006). He finds strong 
evidence to support the relationship. Utilizing the CPS, Peoples (1994) examines Becker’s 
theory, emphasizing differences in the relationship for union and nonunion members. He 
finds no significant effect of market structure on the racial wage gap for union workers 
and a modest, but consistently significant effect for nonunion workers. His findings  
 
 ¹Heywood (1998) provides a comprehensive review of this literature. 
support the contention that standardized union earnings protect black workers from 
market structure driven discrimination (Freeman, 1980). 
More recent tests of the market structure/discrimination relationship that allow a 
different wage structure for union and nonunion workers (separate wage equations) find 
some support for Becker’s theory for nonunion workers (Agesa and Monaco, 2006), 
whereas studies that restrict the wage determining process to be the same for union 
and nonunion workers (Agesa and Hamilton, 2004; Coleman, 2004) find no evidence of 
the relationship. Specifically, Coleman (2004) utilizes a unique dataset which allows the 
measurement discrimination using respondents’ reports of discrimination, wage inequality 
adjusted for observables, workplace demographics and the probability that the last worker 
hired will be of a particular race or gender, to test the relationships between market 
concentration and earnings and employment discrimination of minorities and women. A 
limitation of this exceptional dataset, however, is the limited overall sample size and the 
extremely limited number of observations for each subgroup by race and gender, only 
permitting a single equation estimation of wages for all groups. Such a procedure restricts 
the wage determining process to be the same for workers by gender, racial and union 
status. He finds no evidence that domestic competition reduces earnings discrimination 
by race or gender. 
Recent study by Agesa and Hamilton (2004) tests Becker’s theory, examining if 
increased domestic and foreign competition increase racial earnings equality. Taking 
advantage of the large number of observations in the PUMS, they estimate individual 
wage equations by industry and race for workers in each three-digit Census Industry 
Code (CIC) manufacturing industry. Their specification allows the measurement of the 
impact of domestic and foreign competition on wages discrimination while allowing for 
industry differences in wage structure. However, the PUMS provides no control for 
union member- ship. Thus, they do not test for a different impact of imports on racial 
wages of union and nonunion workers. They find inconclusive evidence that imports 
reduce discrimination. 
The literature on the effects of imports on wages by market structure suggests that 
workers in concentrated industries experience a larger wage penalty than workers in less-
concentrated industries (Borjas and Ramey, 1995). Yet, the outcome of our analysis is 
not a forgone conclusion, as recent study offers conflicting findings regarding the 
impact of imports on wages by union status (Macpherson and Stewart, 1990; Shippen and 
Lynch, 2002). Indeed, in concentrated industries, if imports invoke a large wage penalty 
on unionized employment – where wage uniformity has been the norm and, consequently, 
racial earnings disparity is historically less (relative to nonunion employment) – then 
imports-induced wage penalties for covered workers may be uniformly distributed to 
black and white covered workers. In contrast, in concentrated industries, if white, 
uncovered workers benefit more from labour rent sharing relative to their black 
counterparts, we expect that increased efficiency induced by foreign competition will 
reduce the wages of uncovered white workers. 
 
 
 
III. Data 
 
To test the relationship between global competition and racial wage disparity, we use 
data from the CPS ORGs for the period 1995 to 2002. We follow the convention of past 
studies of the relationship, combining multiple years of the CPS to provide a sample large 
enough to test our hypothesis. Our sub-sample of the CPS ORG contains black and white 
males aged 16–65 years who are employed full time in manufacturing industries. As 
individuals appear twice in the ORG files, we eliminate individuals’ second appearance in 
the dataset. We also remove managers from our sample, as they are not routinely 
covered by collective bargaining agreements. Additionally, roughly 30% of wage earners 
in the CPS ORG do not report earnings (Hirsch and Schumacher, 2004).² Earnings for 
these workers are imputed using a hot-deck procedure, assigning these individuals the 
earnings of a donor worker with an identical match for a set of characteristics. A problem 
occurs because workers’ industry and union coverage are not included in the set of 
matched characteristics. Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) suggest that a match bias problem 
occurs as a result of including observations with imputed wages in the analyses. Moreover, 
in this analysis, including workers with imputed earnings results in biased estimates, as the 
earnings of imputed earners are largely uncorrelated with union coverage, industry 
concentration and import penetration, key variables in the determination of the impact 
of foreign and domestic competition on racial earnings. Thus, we eliminate workers with 
imputed earnings.³ 
To control for industry characteristics, we supplement individual-level data with 
industry-level data from the 1997 Census of Manufacturers (Bureau of the Census, US 
Department of Commerce, 1998). Industry characteristics include the capital-to-labour 
ratio (K/L = industry gross book value of plant and equipment/industry employment), 
plant size (plant size = industry employment/number of establishments) and four-firm 
concentration ratios. Industry characteristics from the Census were converted from five-
digit North American   Industry Classification System (NAICS) to three-digit CIC by 
weighing industry value of shipments. Additionally, data on union density by three-digit 
CIC are taken from Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). For each three-digit industry, a 3-year 
moving average of union density is calculated for each year from 1995 to 2002 to reduce 
the effect of measurement error in any year.  
Data on international trade are from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) US Trade Database, 1989 to 2001 (Feenstra et al., 2002). The impact of trade 
on an industry is measured by the Import Penetration Ratio (ipr).  Particularly ipr for 
each three-digit CIC industry, in each year 1995 to 2001, is calculated as: ipr = 
imports/(value of shipments - exports + imports), where the variable, value of shipments 
for each industry and year is taken from the Census of Manufacturers for that year. 
 
 
 
2In the 1995 CPS ORGs, imputed wages cannot be identified for workers in the files of January to August. Therefore, 
all manufacturing workers occurring in these months of 1995 are eliminated from the analysis. 
3 A possible limitation of eliminating imputed earners is that it may create selection bias. Particularly, selection bias 
of earnings nonresponse by race would undermine the legitimacy of our results regarding the effect of imports on the racial 
wage gap. To reveal potential nonresponse bias, we examined the proportion of nonresponders in our data by racial 
group and union status and find roughly equivalent proportions of earnings nonresponders for black and white workers 
(29% and 31%, respectively), although nonresponse was slightly higher for union workers relative to nonunion (6% 
points higher). A recent analysis of the bias of earnings nonresponse in the CPS reveals that earnings nonresponse 
varies little with respect to most earnings attributes but is noticeably highest among workers in the top percentiles of 
the predicted earnings distribution (Bollinger and Hirsch, 2007), results consistent with our findings of slightly higher 
nonresponse for union workers, a group that has higher average earnings relative to their nonunion counterparts. 
IV. Methodology 
 
We first utilize a switching regression procedure to bifurcate workers into highly- and 
less-concentrated industries.⁴ The critical concentration level is taken to be 50%. Thus, 
industries with four-firm concentration ratios equal to or exceeding 50% are classified as 
‘highly concentrated’, while those lower than this threshold are considered ‘less 
concentrated’. Highly concentrated industries include engine and turbines, aircraft, ship 
and boat building, railroad equipment and household appliances. In general, these 
industries are characterized by high value addition in the production process.  In contrast, 
food industries and other low value-added industries comprise less-concentrated industries. 
Examples include meat, dairy and bakery products, as well as cement and screw 
machine products. 
There are limitations of using industry concentration as a measure of domestic 
competition. First, firms in many industries increasingly face competition from firms in 
previously noncompeting industries; as a result, competitors are increasingly difficult to 
define within a given industry. Further, because industry concentration is a national 
statistic, it does not capture local or regional competitiveness. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, market concentration is the typical measure of domestic competition used in the 
analyses of industry market concentration and labour market outcomes. 
We examine the relationship between global com- petition and racial wages utilizing 
the following specification:  
 
 
1n(wagei,un,ms)= a + bX+ cY + dZ + f(ipr)+ g(white)+ h(white x  ipr)+ ui   (1) 
 
1n(wagei,nu,ms)= a + bX+ cY + dZ + f(ipr)+ g(white)+ h(white x  ipr)+ ui   (2) 
 
The variables 1n(wagei,un,ms) and 1n(wagei,nu,ms) are the log of real hourly wages of 
workers (in $2002) of black and white male workers.⁵’⁶ This set of equations is estimated 
separately by two joint criteria: whether workers are covered or not by collective 
bargaining agreements (un and nu indicate union and nonunion workers, respectively) and 
by domestic market structure (ms indicates high- or less-concentrated industries), where X 
is a matrix of worker characteristics include ages and its square, dummies for marital status  
 
 
4A model was estimated which regressed the natural log of workers’ real hourly wage on their age and its square, 
marital status, region of residence, union coverage, educational attainment, occupation, unemployment, plant size, the 
capital–labour ratio and a dummy variable for the concentration ratio. The critical level of domestic competition was 
obtained by choosing the market concentration level demarcation that maximizes the absolute value of the log 
likelihood function (Goldfeld and Quandt, 1973). 
5 In the CPS, weekly earnings are top coded at $1923 from 1995 to 1997 and at $2885 from 1998 to 2002. Hirsch 
and Macpherson (2003) provide estimates of weekly earnings for top-coded males for each year, assuming a Pareto 
distribution (http://www.unionstats.com/). Hourly earnings of top-coded workers in our dataset are calculated by dividing 
the Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) estimates of workers weekly earnings by their usual hours worked per week. 
Additionally, hourly earnings are deflated using the CPI, taken from Economic Report of the President 2003 (Council of 
Economic Advisors, 2003). 
6 In the CPS, hourly earnings include any overtime pay, commissions or tips usually received. To the extent that 
overtime is restricted for black workers, our estimates of racial wage disparity in each union status/market structure 
group provides biased estimates racial wage discrimination for that group. 
(married and separated, divorced or widowed with single omitted), six regional dummies 
(Mid-Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, 
West South Central, Mountain Pacific with New England omitted), seven education 
dummies (middle school, some high school, high school diploma, some college, 2-year 
degree, bachelor, graduate or professional degree, with elementary omitted) and union 
coverage. Dummy variables are also included for occupation (technical, administrative, 
craft, operative transportation and labourers omitted). Industry-level variables include plant 
size and the capital-labour ratio as well as a 3-year moving average of union density. The 
controls for time include annual dummy variables. The omitted years are 1995 (which only 
includes the last 4 months of that year) and 1996. The monthly unemployment rate is also 
included to control for macroeconomic conditions. 
Of particular interest to this study is the impact of import penetration on the wages of blacks 
and whites in each union status and market structure group. The coefficient on ipr, f, captures 
the marginal impact of a percentage point increase in import penetration on wages of the base 
group, black workers. If competition mandates that employers are more efficient in the payment 
of wages, we would expect international competition to negatively impact workers’ wages. The 
coefficient on the interaction term, h, captures the differential impact of imports on the wages of 
whites relative to blacks or, more specifically, the rate at which imports alter the racial wage 
gap. If increased competition from imports reduces the earnings advantage of whites (relative to 
their black counterparts in that union status and market structure subgroup), then the coefficient 
will be negative, indicating that imports increase earnings equality. Because white racial status 
is nonlinear in our wage estimation (Equations 1 and 2), the effects of white racial status on 
wages is equal to the partial derivative of hourly wages with respect to white racial status, 
𝛿𝛿ln(wagei,)/𝛿𝛿 (white). The partial derivative of hourly wages with respect to white racial status 
can be represented as follows: 
 
(eᵍ - 1) x 100 + (𝑒𝑒ℎ  - 1) x 100 x ipr      (3)  
The first term on the right-hand side, ((eg - 1) x 100), captures the portion of the racial 
wage gap in a market structure/union coverage group that is independent of imports, 
where g is the coefficient on white. The second term captures the effect of imports on 
the racial wage gap, where h is the coefficient on the interactive term; thus, (eh - 1) x 
100 measures the rate at which imports change the racial wage gap in a market 
structure/union coverage group. We evaluate ipr at the average import penetration ratio 
for each market structure and union status group to determine the average impact of ipr 
for that group.  It is important to note that our earnings specification assumes that there 
is no racial sorting into unionized industries. Thus, our estimation of labour market 
discrimination in each market structure, union status group is limited to gauging wage 
discrimination. 
Recent study highlights that regression estimation that matches group-level data (in our 
case, industries) to individual-level data (individual workers) biases downward SEs, but 
not necessarily coefficient estimates (Moulton, 1990; Wooldridge, 2002). The bias is a 
result of group (industry) effects in the error term. Specifically, Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) assumes independence of observations; however, in this analysis, industry 
characteristics take on the same value for all workers in an industry, violating the 
assumption of independence. Industry-level variables in our analysis include: plant size, 
capital–labour ratio, union density as well as key variables, industry concentration, 
import penetration and the race/ import penetration interaction. As a result, we utilize 
cluster-adjusted SEs such that observations are assumed independent across industries but 
not independent within industries. Moreover, OLS SEs overstate the significance of 
industry invariant controls (Pepper, 2002).  In this analysis, the use of OLS SEs would 
overstate the significance of imports as a means to reduce racial earnings disparity. 
The above specification utilizes a single equation to estimate the wages of white and black 
workers in each union status/market structure subgroup, constraining the structure of 
earnings to be the same by racial status. Moreover, the tendency for blacks to receive 
different returns to human capital may distort estimates of racial earnings (Johnson, 
1978). As an alternative, we estimate separate wage equations for black and white 
workers in each subgroup. Specifically, 
 
1n(wage𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟,𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚) = a + bX + cY + dZ + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟,𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚         (4) 
 
1n(wage𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟,𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚) = a + bX + cY + dZ + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟,𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚         (5) 
 
where the subscript r indicates race (black (b) or white (w)), ms the market structure 
(high- or less- concentrated industries) and all other variables are as defined in Equations 
1 and 2. Clustered SEs are also used in the estimation of Equations 4 and 5. 
 
 
 
V. Results 
 
Table 1 presents OLS estimates of racial earnings in each domestic market structure 
(concentrated and less-concentrated industries), separate for union and nonunion workers. 
Coefficient estimates for time and regional controls are not presented for brevity. The 
coefficient on ipr allows the measurement of the effect of global competition on the 
wages of black workers by union coverage and domestic market structure subgroup. The 
coefficient on ipr is small and insignificant for each market structure, union status 
subgroup, indicating that imports impose an insignificant wage penalty for blacks in 
manufacturing industries (recall, black workers in each subgroup are the base group). 
The coefficient on the interaction term reveals the differential impact of imports on white 
wages relative to the base group of black workers in each union status and market 
structure subgroup. The interaction term is insignificant for nonunion workers in less-
concentrated industries (column 2, Table 1) and for union workers in high- and less-
concentrated industries (columns 1 and 3, Table 1, respectively). However, an increase 
by 1% in import penetration significantly reduces the wages of nonunion whites in high-
concentrated industries by an additional 0.68% more relative to black nonunion workers 
in that domestic market structure group. These findings suggest that imports 
disproportionately reduce the wages of white nonunion workers in high concentrated 
industries relative to their black counterparts.⁷ These findings support the notion that  
7The marginal impact of a characteristic on the wage of the group in question is found by taking the exponential of 
the estimated coefficient minus one and multiplying by 100. 
 
Table 1.  OLS estimates of earnings of workers in manufacturing 
 
    Less concentrated    Concentrated 
   
Variable     Union Nonunion Union              Nonunion  
 
Age     0.0339*** 0.0553*** 0.0333***         0.0507*** 
     (5.71)  (10.49)  (4.49)  (9.68) 
Age2    -0.0003*** -0.0006*** -0.0003***  -0.0005*** 
(-4.84)  (-9.89)  (-3.55)  (-9.08) 
Middle school 0.1148*** 0.1152*** 0.0010   0.2416*** 
(3.38)  (3.30)  (0.02)  (5.28) 
Some high school 0.1914*** 0.1969*** 0.0748*   0.1880*** 
(4.89)  (9.57)  (1.93)  (3.65) 
High school diploma   0.2992*** 0.3517*** 0.1575*** 0.4052*** 
(9.34)  (13.34)  (3.70)  (8.96) 
Some college 0.3829*** 0.4345*** 0.2206***  0.5110***   
(10.97)  (14.96)  (5.59)  (8.53) 
2-year degree 0.415*** 0.4806*** 0.2315*** 0.5282***    
(11.54)  (15.33)  (5.54)  (11.47) 
Bachelor 0.4156*** 0.6514*** 0.3128***  0.7423*** 
(9.88)  (18.07)  (6.27)  (9.52) 
Graduate or professional school  0.4823*** 0.8744*** 0.4695*** 0.8921*** 
(6.72)  (18.91)  (3.74)  (14.54) 
Married     0.1018*** 0.1540*** 0.0992***  0.1308*** 
     (5.83)  (10.73)  (9.08)  (6.10) 
Separated, divorced or widowed  0.08889*** 0.0862*** 0.0703*** 0.0821*** 
(5.18)  (7.30)  (3.31)  (2.44) 
Metropolitan statistical area  0.0740*** 0.0798*** 0.1545*** 0.1067*** 
(4.21)  (5.89)  (7.60)  (3.73) 
Monthly unemployment rate  -0.1944   -0.0210  -0.0152      -0.5823 
     (-0.93)  (-1.62)  (-0.79)  (-1.48) 
Capital-to-labour ratio   0.0013*** 0.0001** 0.0021    0.0001 
     (2.30)  (2.63)  (1.35)  (1.52) 
Union density    0.4429*** 0.2804*** 1.0672*** 0.3411 
     (3.68)  (2.40)  (2.74)  (1.62) 
Import penetration ratio   0.0008  0.0004  -0.0051 0.0019 
     (0.68)  (0.63)  (-0.83)  (0.51) 
White     0.0950*** 0.1050*** 0.0613  0.2378*** 
     (3.27)  (6.27)  (0.48)  (5.51) 
White x import penetration  0.0004  0.0011  -0.0006 -0.0069*** 
     (0.63)  (1.64)  (-0.14)  (-3.53) 
Constant    9.2309*** 8.3186*** 9.1010*** 8.7705*** 
     (56.46)  (41.52)  (31.34)  (34.93) 
Sample Size               5717           24091             2021             3297 
R2     0.2962  0.4929  0.3480  0.5272 
 
Notes: Each regression also includes controls for year in sample, seven regional dummies, five 
occupational controls and average plant size. 
 *, ** and *** denote test statistic significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
imports induce increased racial earnings equality for non- union workers in concentrated 
industries.⁸ 
In each union status and market structure sub- group, the partial derivative of wages with 
respect to white racial status, 𝛿𝛿 ln(wage𝑖𝑖)/𝛿𝛿(white), captures the white wage advantage. 
We evaluate ipr at the average import penetration ratio for each market structure and union 
status group⁹ Table 2 provides a more easily interpretable summary of the two 
components that make up the partial effects of white racial status for each union 
status/market structure group. The first term indicates the impact of coefficient g, the 
portion of the white wage advantage that is independent of foreign competition. If we 
compare the first term of the partial effects for nonunion workers in high- and less-
concentrated industries (26.85% and 11.07% points, respectively), the advantage is much 
smaller in less-concentrated industries. Our finding 
 
Table 2.  The partial effects of white racial status evaluated at average import 
 
 Penetration ratios  
High-concentrated industries Less-concentrated industries 
Union workers 
Nonunion workers 
6.32 - 1.39= 4.93 
26.85 - 13.69 =13.13** 
9.97 - 0.90= 9.07** 
11.07 þ 2.66 = 13.73*** 
Notes: Partial effects are evaluated at the average ipr for that market structure, union status 
group. The first term is calculated: (𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔 − 1) x 100, where g is defined in Equations 1 and 2. The 
second term is 
calculated as: (𝑒𝑒ℎ − 1) x 100 x ipr, where ipr is the average ipr and h is defined in Equations 1 and 
2. 
F-tests reveal if the above test statistics are significantly different from zero. 
** and *** denote test statistic significance at the 95 and 99% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
For nonunion workers that the portion of the white wage advantage that is independent 
of foreign competition is smaller in less-concentrated industries relative to concentrated 
industries indicate that fierce domestic competition promotes increased racial earnings 
equality for nonunion workers (Heywood, 1987; Peoples, 1994). For union workers, the 
portion of the white wage advantage that is independent of foreign competition is 9.97% 
and 6.32% points in less- and high-concentrated industries, respectively. Larger racial 
wage gaps that are not attributable to imports in less-concentrated industries may indicate 
that collective bargaining is less effective in standardizing wages by race in less- 
concentrated industries. 
In Table 2, the second term of the partial derivative of wages with respect to white racial 
 
8 It may be that there is selection to union coverage. To test this notion, we employ the Heckman (1976) sample 
selection procedure. In the first stage, we perform reduced form probit models of union coverage separately for 
workers in high- and less-concentrated industries. The explanatory variables include controls for race, marital status, 
region, education, experience, occupation, time, industry and a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the worker’s 
state of residence is a right-to-work state and 0 otherwise, for identification (Hirsch and Berger, 1984). From this 
estimation, the authors generate the inverse mills ratio (lambda) separately for each union status/market concentration 
subgroup. In a second stage, Equations 1 and 2 were run and that also included the respective inverse of mills ratio for 
each union status/market concentration subgroup. We find little evidence of selection bias in our estimates of the 
effect of imports on racial discrimination. Particularly, we find no marked difference in the magnitude or significance 
of our race, import and interaction coefficients relative to OLS results reported in Table 1 
9Average ipr is 23.25 and 19.84 for covered and uncovered workers in concentrated industries, respectively, and 22.42 
and 24.21 for their respective counterparts in less-concentrated industries. 
status captures changes in the white wage advantage as a result of imports. Recall that 
h, the rate at which imports alter the racial wage gap, is significant solely for nonunion 
workers in high-concentrated industries. Evaluating this term at the average ipr for this 
group, we find that in high-concentrated industries, imports reduce the wages of white 
nonunion workers by 13.69% points, resulting in an overall white wage advantage for this 
group of 13.13% points. These findings provide support for the notion that imports 
invoke a large and significant wage penalty for white nonunion workers in high-
concentrated industries (relative to their black counterparts). Additionally, we find that 
the second term of the partial derivative is quite small for union workers in high- and less-
concentrated industries (-1.39% and -0.9% points, respectively, indicating that imports 
play a limited role in curtailing market power initiated discrimination of union workers 
regardless of the level of national competition. 
Tables 3 and 4 separately present regression estimates by racial status in each 
market structure and union status subgroup (Equations 4 and 5). Particularly, we 
separately examine the estimated impact of imports on the wages of black and white 
workers in each subgroup. Imports insignificantly impact black and white workers in each 
category with the exception of white nonunion workers in concentrated industries. 
Particularly, an increase by 1% in import penetration significantly reduces the wages of 
nonunion whites in high-concentration industries by 0.46%, whereas imports 
insignificantly impact their black counterparts and black and white workers in all other 
market structure/union status subgroup. 
It may be that the insignificant effect of imports on the wages of black in a market 
structure/union status subgroup stems from large SEs, resulting from the limited number 
of observations of black workers in the subgroup. Thus, it is useful to contrast the 
magnitude of the coefficients for black and white workers in each subgroup as further 
indication of whether imports influence the wages of blacks and whites equally. With 
the exception of nonunion workers in high-concentrated industries, the magnitude of the 
imports effect is quite uniform for black and white workers in each subgroup. Indeed, in 
concentrated industries, the marginal impact of imports is roughly an insignificant 0.5% for 
both black and white union workers (Table 3), indicating that in concentrated industries, 
imports-induced wage penalties are equally distributed to black and white union workers. 
Further, we find that imports marginally but insignificantly increases the wages of union 
and nonunion blacks and whites in less-concentrated industries by 0.1%. These findings 
provide additional evidence that imports-induced wage penalties are unique to white 
nonunion workers in concentrated industries. Further, these findings are consistent with 
the notion that white nonunion workers in concentrated industries disproportionately 
benefit from labour rent sharing; hence, they bear the brunt of the burden of imports-
induced wage penalties. 
It is interesting to contrast the findings of our analysis to the findings if imputed 
earners are included in the data and utilizing an empirical specification with OLS SEs 
(rather than clustered SEs). In a separate analysis not shown but available on request, 
Equations 1 and 2 were run for each market structure/union coverage group; however, 
imputed earners were included in the analysis and the specification utilized OLS SEs. 
Although the number of observations increased in each market structure/union coverage 
group as a result on including imputed earners, the overall fit of each model declined 
dramatically. Particularly, the adjusted R² decreased 0.10–0.15 points lower for each  
Table 3. OLS estimates of earnings of workers in concentrated industries 
 
 Union   Nonunion 
Variable White Black  White Black 
Age 0.0373*** 0.0141  0.0515*** 0.0316 
 (3.98) (1.10)  (9.37) (1.60) 
Age2  -0.0004***     
(-3.35) 
 -0.0005 
 (-0.32) 
 0.0005***   
(-9.16) 
-0.0003 
(-1.49) 
Middle school  -0.0628 0.1563*** 0.2312*** 0.4763 
                       (-0.91)                       (7.03)                        (4.71)                       (1.08) 
 Some high school   0.012         0.2895***           0.1565***                0.5963    
(0.28)        (6.22)          (2.79)           (1.42) 
 High school diploma           0.1227**        0.4678***                  0.3917***            0.6600  
         (2.41)        (8.21)           (8.89)           (1.55) 
 Some college          0.1848***        0.5792***            0.4949***            0.7756  
    (3.52)        (6.71)              (8.04)           (1.83) 
 2-year degree                       0.2013***         0.4731***            0.5077***            0.8588*  
         (3.90)        (4.28)         (10.52)           (2.13) 
 Bachelor         0.2843***        0.5966***         0.7343***            0.9153*  
         (4.97)          (4.74)           (9.14)                      (2.03) 
 Graduate or professional school                0.4350*** 0.6579*  0.8707***               1.3276*** 
                     (3.67)                       (1.92)                          (13.77)                        (2.94) 
Married                                                          0.0871***                 0.1477***                  0.1335***             0.1320** 
                                                                       (7.30) (5.25) (6.49) (2.33) 
Single, divorced or widowed 0.0590** 0.1709*** 0.0758** 0.1396 
                      (2.54)                       (3.20)                        (2.20)                        (1.70) 
Metropolitan statistical area 0.1615*** 0.0512 0.0976*** 0.1798*** 
                      (7.51)                       (0.92)                        (3.20)                        (3.48) 
Monthly unemployment rate  -0.0203 0.0253  -0.0568  -0.0703 
                    (-1.06)                     (0.34)                         (-1.43)        (-0.51) 
Capital-to-labour ratio 0.0001 0.0001* -0.0001                      0.0001 
                      (1.08)                       (2.00)                         (-1.62)                       (0.10) 
Union density 1.0068** 1.2414                  0.2752  0.4491 
 (2.68) (1.22)  (1.26)  (1.11) 
Import penetration -0.0054  -0.0045  -0.0046* 0.0014 
Constant 
(-1.20) 
                      9.2091*** 
 (-0.55) 
8.4409*** 
(-1.79) 
   9.0128*** 
(0.42) 
8.9238*** 
 (43.69) (21.84) (34.30) (10.51) 
Sample size 1773 239 3027 270 
R2 0.3621 0.3592 0.5305 0.4991 
Notes: Each regression also includes controls for year in sample, seven regional dummies, five 
occupational controls and average plant size. 
*, ** and *** denote test statistic significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
market structure/union coverage group relative to the model with omitted imputed  
earners. Further, the magnitude of the coefficients on many variables is smaller with the 
inclusion of imputed earners. Particularly, in high-concentrated industries, the impact of 
imports on the wages of nonunion whites is less than half the magnitude in the model that 
includes imputed earners, illustrating that in this case, match bias reduces estimates of 
imports-induced racial wage equality for this group of workers. 
In a second stage, Equations 1 and 2 were run for each market structure/union coverage 
group. Imputed earners were included; however, the empirical specification utilized 
clustered SEs. The magnitude of the coefficients remained fairly constant, but the SEs 
increased, particularly for the industry invariant controls. These findings suggest that 
past studies of the relationship that utilize the CPS suffer from two effects (Agesa and 
Monaco, 2006; Peoples, 1994). The inclusion of imputed earners reduces the explanatory 
power of the models, possibly, also reducing the magnitude and significance of the 
market power controls (whether it is a measure of domestic or foreign competition). On 
the other hand, the use of OLS SEs in this study overstates the significance of industry 
invariant controls, thus overstating the significance of competition in reducing 
discrimination¹⁰ʼ¹¹ 
It is also necessary to reconcile our results with past findings regarding the impact of 
foreign competition on racial wage equality. The findings of this analysis indicate 
imports-induced racial earnings equality exclusively for nonunion workers in high- 
concentrated industries. Agesa and Hamilton (2004) find an insignificant impact of 
imports on racial earnings disparity for a combined group of union and nonunion of 
manufacturing workers in concentrated industries. Moreover, in combining union and 
non- union workers in concentrated industries, wage standardization and less 
discriminatory wages of union workers may have overshadowed the significant effect of 
imports in promoting racial wage equality for nonunion workers in Agesa and Hamilton’s 
analysis, thus resulting in their findings of an insignificant imports effect. 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This study examines the relationship between global competition and racial wages for 
union and nonunion workers in manufacturing industries. Our empirical examination of 
the relationship is novel in two dimensions. First, our sub-sample of manufacturing 
workers from the CPS ORGs omits workers with imputed wages. The elimination of 
imputed earners is necessary, as recent study provides evidence of substantial match bias 
by including imputed earners in analyses in which variables not included in the donor 
matching criteria are the key determinants of the results (Hirsch and Schumacher, 
2004). In our case, union coverage and industry of employment are not included in the 
matching criteria. As a result, the wages of imputed earners would be largely uncorrelated  
with union coverage, industry union density, industry concentration and the import  
  
10It is possible that the findings of our analysis are contingent upon the level of industry aggregation. Indeed, the progression of 
the literature on market structure and discrimination reveals increased precision of estimates of the relationship with increased 
precision in defining industries, moving from two-digit industry coding (Fujii and Trapani, 1978; Johnson, 1978) to three digit 
(Heywood, 1987). Thus, it is likely that precision of estimates would continue to increase with even finer industry classification. 
Notwithstanding, the precision of estimates in this analysis is limited to the three-digit industry coding used in the CPS. 
11A potential shortcoming of this analysis is that cyclical effects in the data may have resulted in the inaccurate measurement of 
wage discrimination in each market structure/union coverage subgroup. Particularly, wage discrimination may be 
countercyclical, increasing with downturns in the economy. To test this notion, we calculate the average unemployment rate for 
the observation period 1995 to 2002 (4.89%) and separate the data for this analysis into two groups, manufacturing workers in 
above-average unemployment rate years (1995, 1996, 1997 and 2002) and those in below-average unemployment rate years 
(1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001). Then, the wage specifications outlined in Equations 1 and 2 were run separately for each 
unemployment rate (above average or below)/union coverage (union or nonunion)/market concentration (high- or less-
concentrated) subgroup. We find little evidence of countercyclical effects of wage discrimination. Particularly, the sign and 
magnitude of the coefficients of the race, imports and interaction terms are quite similar for above- and below-average 
unemployment rate groups, albeit coefficients are insignificant given the smaller sample size. It is interesting to note that the 
proportion of workers in the data who are black is smaller in the above-average unemployment rate group relative to the below-
average unemployment rate. This is true for both union and nonunion workers, providing some evidence that employment 
discrimination may be countercyclical for union and nonunion workers. 
Table  4.  OLS estimates of earnings of workers in less-concentrated industries 
 
 
Union Nonunion 
 
  
Variable White Black White Black 
 
 
Age  0.0338*** 0.0353***  0.0568***  0.0341*** 
(5.08) (3.32) (10.40) (6.17) 
Age2  -0.0003*** -0.0003***   -0.0007*** -0.0004*** 
(-4.36) (-2.52) (-9.76) (-5.46) 
Middle  school 0.1169*** 0.0696 0.1155*** 0.0561 
(3.20) (0.69) (3.13) (1.19) 
Some high school 0.2062*** 0.0230 0.2029*** 0.0363 
(4.89) (0.20) (9.47) (0.81) 
High  school  diploma 0.3104*** 0.1605 0.3626*** 0.1386*** 
(9.00) (1.74) (13.09) (3.40) 
Some college  0.3952*** 0.2359**  0.4429***  0.2522*** 
(10.86) (2.36) (15.03) (4.63) 
2-year degree  0.4215*** 0.3103***  0.4907***  0.2533*** 
(11.30) (3.08) (15.18) (3.75) 
Bachelor  0.1396*** 0.2039  0.6607***  0.4487*** 
(9.04) (1.65) (18.18) (5.62) 
Graduate or professional school 0.4835*** 0.2646 0.8794*** 0.8136*** 
(6.64) (2.09) (19.00) (6.85) 
Married  0.1050*** 0.0726  0.1566***  0.1323*** 
(5.19) (1.51) (9.95) (5.98) 
Single, divorced or Widowed 0.0943*** 0.0371 0.0902*** 0.0495 
(4.22) (0.65) (6.76) (1.92) 
Metropolitan statistical area 0.0696*** 0.1346*** 0.0805*** 0.0905*** 
(4.00) (3.52) (5.53) (4.17) 
Monthly unemployment rate -0.0166 -0.0420 -0.0246 0.0380 
                                                                 (-0.75) (-0.63) (-1.84) (0.76) 
Capital-to-labour ratio 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 
 (0.19) (4.87) (1.65) (5.81) 
Union density 4.2535*** 0.6796*** 0.2720 0.3805*** 
 (3.42) (5.31) (2.28) (2.79) 
Import penetration 0.0011 0.0015 0.0014 0.0010 
 (1.55) (1.63) (1.45) (1.33) 
Constant 9.3061*** 9.3725*** 8.4010*** 8.6332*** 
 (55.27) (24.92) (38.58) (25.67) 
Sample size                                                 5172                        545                            22332                             1759 
R²     0.2934   0.3290       0.4930      0.4048 
 
Notes: Each regression also includes controls for year in sample, seven regional dummies, five 
occupational controls and average plant size. 
** and *** denote test statistic significance at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
penetration ratio. 
Second, we utilize clustered SEs in our estimation procedure, which allows for 
independence of observations across industries but not within industries. Such a procedure 
prevents the overstatement of the significance of covariates in explaining the  dependent 
variable (Pepper, 2002). In this analysis, clustered SEs prevent the exaggeration of the 
significance of imports as a means to reduce racial earnings disparity. 
We find little evidence that imports increase racial earnings equality for nonunion 
workers in less-concentrated industries. These findings are consistent with the notion that 
fierce domestic competition invokes increased efficiency and racial wage equity such that 
imports have a limited role in reducing racial wage discrepancies. Yet, in high-
concentrated industries, we find that nonunion whites receive a substantial wage 
premium that is independent of imports relative to their black counterparts. However, 
imports cause the wages of this group of nonunion whites to converge towards market 
rates. These findings indicate that imports promote increased racial earnings equality 
primarily of non-union workers in concentrated industries. We find no evidence of 
imports-induced earnings equality for union workers in concentrated industries. Indeed, 
wage penalties for union workers are quite uniformly distributed to black and white 
covered workers. These findings suggest that collective bargaining provides black 
covered workers a sanctuary from market power initiated discrimination. 
Two caveats are in order. First, this analysis utilizes data on manufacturing workers 
to examine the global competition/racial wages relationship; however, the manufacturing 
sector constitutes a small and declining portion of the US workforce, currently about 
15%. As a result, this analysis provides at best an incomplete picture of the effects of 
competition on racial earnings for all workers in the labour market.  
Second, it is important to note that our findings do not indicate that nonunion blacks in 
concentrated industries are the only blacks who experience earnings discrimination. Indeed, 
we find that blacks in three of the four union coverage/market structure subgroups face 
substantial and significant wage disparity that is insignificantly reduced by foreign 
competition, indicating the limitations of domestic and international competition as tools 
for mitigating racial wage inequities. Thus, if our findings for manufacturing workers 
are indicative of the entire labour force, it is likely that overall racial wage equality is not 
attainable by union coverage or increased domestic and global competition. To this extent, 
increased government intervention may be a necessary policy prescription. 
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